The Deconstruction Theory of Derrida and Heidegger - A Study

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In this paper I will discuss Heidegger's destruction and Derrida's critique of it in his deconstruction. I will read destruction in various Heidegger texts and discuss Derrida's intervention through his critique of destruction in deconstruction. Heidegger writes that metaphysics is in decline and is approaching its end, as the earth informed by metaphysics has become desolate, as is evident from the events of the last century. This decline marks the oblivion of Being as metaphysics, as the truth of metaphysics has met its desolation. Heidegger argues that metaphysics has been an illusion that sustained reality and is now approaching its end, in place, truth needs to be rethought as the unconcealment of Being as aletheia. In this disclosure of Being, the essence of Being in is factity, thrown-ness, temporality is revealed and the metaphysical past of Being meets its oblivion. However, this so called overcoming of metaphysics becomes repetition of metaphysics in every sense as it designates metaphysics as something to be overcome and destroyed. It thus proceeds entirely within its terms rather than proceeding to new territory. Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics is hence, a repetition of it.

Heidegger on Destruction

Heidegger writes that the task of philosophy is the destruction of the history of ontology:

> We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being: the ways which have guided us ever since. (Heidegger, 1962:44)

Proposed in 1927 in *Being and Time*, this notion of destruction of ancient ontology may be illuminated further what Heidegger writes of the end of philosophy in his 1964 essay “The End of Philosophy and the task of thinking.” Heidegger’s project in these texts is to rethink philosophy by pronouncing an end or destruction of traditional metaphysics and rethink the task of thinking that takes the form of aletheia, or unconcealing, of truth. The question we will first concern ourselves with is this destruction of ancient ontology. What does the destruction of the tradition entail and what are its implications?
Firstly to analyze the passage, “task” refers to the task of destruction, which means putting aside or dismantling merely historical in assertions about the history of philosophy and metaphysics. Destroying the traditional content of ancient ontology means overcoming metaphysics by moving beyond philosophy as realism and idealism, which are primarily epistemological, into philosophy as ontology, which involves a primordial grasp of philosophy as the disclosure or unconcealing of Being. As Heidegger has argued, destruction is not liquidating, but rather putting aside and dismantling assertions about philosophy which are merely historical. The task of philosophy is now to overcome metaphysics, taking the question of Being as our clue, for Heidegger’s interest is moving beyond the mere metaphysical assertions about philosophy to move into ontology. This is a more primordial grasp of Being and the essence of Dasein as temporality and being-towards-death as well as the hermeneutics of facticity and an awareness of Dasein’s comportment to the world as worldhood, which relates Dasein to objects as equipment and ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand. (Heidegger, 1962:67) The primordial experiences which have determined the ways of Being are the experiences of worldhood as care and anxiety, and boredom Dasein experiences being-in-the-world and thrown-ness through the disclosure of this state through moods such as angst and boredom, in which Dasein experiences a sense of alienation and inauthenticity or discomfort with Dasein’s thrown-ness in the world, or being-in-the-world. (Heidegger, 1962: 182-184)

**Destroying Ancient Ontology and the task of philosophy**

Heidegger writes in What is Philosophy that destruction does not mean destroying but dismantling, liquidating, putting to one side the merely historical assertions about the history of philosophy. (Heidegger, 1956: 73) The task of philosophy is now designated by Heidegger to overcome the history of metaphysics, which has trapped philosophy in representational thinking and Platonism. In place of metaphysics as representation or logos, Heidegger writes that philosophy should be an inquiry into the being of Being, thus moving philosophy beyond metaphysics into the realm of ontology. The history of metaphysics, or ancient ontology, has to be overcome as it inaccurately creates a division between ideal and real, subject and object. Heidegger argues that these are conflated in Being, which is the founding condition of possibility and ontological ground for both. The end of philosophy signals the end of metaphysics as ancient ontology, or representational thought which presents a perfect correlation between essence and existence, concept and reality, because these are conflated in Being, which is the ground of possibility for thinking both. Essence
and existence are united in Being, and Being is the ground of possibility for thinking both. As Heidegger argues in The End of Philosophy:

If the questions raised are thought through even thoroughly, the illusion of being as a matter of course, in which the distinction of essentia and existentia stands for all metaphysics, disappears. This distinction is groundless if metaphysics simply tries gain and again to define the limits of what is divided, and comes up with numbering the manners of possibility and the kinds of actuality which float into vagueness, together with the difference in which they are already placed. (Heidegger, 1973:3)

Heidegger argues that the distinction between essentia and existentia that has held throughout the history of metaphysics presents an illusion and becomes groundless as both are united in Being, which is the ontological ground of both and thus precedes both.

Heidegger argues that metaphysics has sustained itself through an illusory distinction between whatness and thatness, or ideal and real. Heidegger argues that Being, or thatness, makes possible the essence of Being, or whatness, hence metaphysics has proceeded along failed presuppositions. In Being, whatness and thatness are united, Being translates as the ontological pre-condition that determines both. Truth as metaphysics, which has sustained itself through the illusory distinction between whatness and thatness, has thus approached its end. Heidegger argues that the task of thinking becomes to rethink truth as aletheia, or the disclosure of Being as truth. Truth has to be rethought as the unconcealing of Being as aletheia, rather than as a concealment as the Greeks such as Plato and Aristotle have interpreted it. Heidegger’s conflation of essence and existence in Being does nothing to alter the fundamental structure of metaphysics which he borrows from and thus affirms. As Derrida argues, (Derrida, 1980: 351) Heidegger inverts or negates metaphysics only to repeat it. Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics is thus a repetition of metaphysics in every sense of the word as a negative metaphysics remains a form of metaphysics as it borrows from its ontological structure and vocabulary.

Structure, Sign and Play

Derrida says that it is naive to refer to an event, doctrine or an author to designate the occurrence of decentering and a thinking of structurality of structure, as it is no doubt part of the totality of an era, but still it has always already begun to proclaim itself and begun to work. (Derrida, 1980: 355) The names he chooses, Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger are indications only of a movement and a thinking of decentering and the structurality of structure that always has been already inscribed in the discourse itself. He thus implies that the thinking of the structurality of
structure has always been implicit in discourse and these names that he chooses could be entirely arbitrary but are those that have formulated the thinking of the structurality of structure in its most radical formulation. (Derrida, 1980: 356)

There is no thought that escapes structure, whether it involves building a system around an *arche* or a system that decenters it. There is no language outside metaphysics and the structures that determine it. All languages and thought affirm the structurality of structure. As Derrida puts it: This event I call a rupture, the disruption I alluded to at the beginning of this paper, presumably would have come about when the structurality of structure had begun to be thought, that is to say, repeated, and this is why I said this disruption was repetition in every sense of the word.” (Derrida, 1980: 353) The rupture of metaphysics thus involved repetition and redoubling rather than being any simple decentering of metaphysics. Derrida argues that the event of a rupture that comes with the decentering of metaphysics involves a redoubling of metaphysics and an opening of metaphysics to think its Other. To quote Derrida, “What would this event be then? Its exterior form would be that of a rupture and a redoubling.” (Derrida, 1980: 351) Structure is something that has either been affirmed or deviated from, all the time being re-inscribed in discourse. No discourse escapes structure and the metaphysical constraints it imposes in the form of the structurality of structure, whether the center is affirmed or negated. As Derrida argues:

> There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language – no syntax or lexicon- which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest.” (Derrida, 1980: 354)

Derrida thus argues that we have no language which is not already informed by metaphysical presuppositions; hence, all destructions of metaphysics that proceed from within the confines of language repeat the metaphysics they seek to destroy.

There is thus nothing outside the text, the text being the structurality of structure, whether it negates or affirms presence all thought affirms that the possibility of metaphysics comes about through its repetition, or iterability. The sense of history implied by the structure of repeatability is the history of the determination of being as presence, where there is an origin that is referred to and recalled in its repetition. The nostalgia for a lost origin, a presence and self-presence of innocence of a prior time untainted by chance and skepticism, is what has determined the structure of repeatability, a history of being as presence. (Derrida, 1988: 367) Derrida argues that this historic determination of being as presence is a myth. The mark only exists through its mediation and iteration. It
does not exist separately from its iteration. As Derrida argues, “The
Absolute is passage.” Ideality is constituted through repetition. Hence
there is no instance of the mark that lies outside the structure of its
iteration. All thought is always delay; it is communicated to us through
the passage of differance. It follows that the structurality of structure has
determined human thought and philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche;
metaphysics has always re-inscribed itself in human thought whether as
a positive or a negative. Metaphysics has been repeated even in non-
metaphysics like Heidegger’s, whose destruction of metaphysics is in
every sense a repetition of it.

Derrida’s solution to the transcendental-empirical conundrum differs
from Heidegger’s, in that he does not dispute the transcendental, but
finds a mid-point and meeting ground between the transcendental and
empirical. This he does through his positing of the quasi-transcendental,
or the repetition of the transcendental in the empirical, and the
relationship between the transcendental and the empirical is coined as
differance, a nothing that separates the transcendental and empirical
that remains a difference rather than performing an inversion of
metaphysics only to repeat it as Heidegger does.

**Overcoming metaphysics and the End of philosophy**

Still on the “destruction of ancient ontology”, Heidegger writes in *The End
of Philosophy* that metaphysics is something to be overcome:

What does ‘overcoming metaphysics’ mean? In the thinking of the
history of Being, his rubric is used only as an aid for that thinking
to be comprehensible at all. In truth, this rubric is the occasion for
a great deal of misunderstanding because it doesn’t allow
experience to reach the ground in virtue of which the history of
Being first reveals its essence. This essence is the Appropriating in
which Being itself is overcome. Above all, overcoming does not
mean thrusting aside a discipline from the field of philosophical
‘education.’ ‘Metaphysics’ is already thought as the destiny of the
truth of beings, that is, of beingness, as a still hidden but
distinctive Appropriating, namely the oblivion of Being. (Heidegger,
1973; 84-5)

Since overcoming is meant as a product of philosophy, the more
adequate rubric might be the past of metaphysics. Of course this calls forth
new erroneous positions. “The past” means here to perish and enter what
has been. In that metaphysics perishes, it is past. The past does not
exclude, but rather includes, the fact that metaphysics is now for the
first time beginning its unconditional rule in beings themselves, and
rules as beings in the form, devoid of truth, of what is real and of objects.
Experienced in virtue of the dawning of an origin, metaphysics, is
however, at the same time, past in the sense that it has entered its ending. The ending lasts longer than the previous history of metaphysics.

Heidegger argues that metaphysics has been the ground of misunderstanding by preventing access in experience to the essence of Being. This essence of Being is something that itself allows the overcoming of Being, it is an acknowledgement of the temporality, facticity, and thrown-ness of Being. While metaphysics has been thought to be the truth of being, it translates as the oblivion of Being, namely, it destroys and prevents access to the disclosure of Being as *aletheia*, of Being as fundamentally situated and thrown in the world. The history of metaphysics becomes something to be overcome, as this past binds us to an erroneous conception of truth as an idea, or essence that is concealed. Heidegger argues that metaphysics has entered its end with the disclosure of Being, or *aletheia*, as truth in place of truth as metaphysics.

Heidegger writes that metaphysics is in decline and is approaching its end as the earth informed by metaphysics has become desolate, evident from the events of the last century. This decline marks the oblivion of Being as metaphysics, as the truth of metaphysics has met its desolation. Heidegger argues that metaphysics has been an illusion that sustained reality and is now approaching its end. In its place, truth needs to be rethought as the unconcealment of Being as *aletheia*. In this disclosure of Being, the essence of Being in is factity, thrown-ness, temporality is revealed and the metaphysical past of Being meets its oblivion.

**The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking**

In the “End of Philosophy and the task of thinking,” Heidegger writes that philosophy as metaphysics has reached its end. This refers to metaphysics that thinks beings as being in the manner of representational thinking, which presents the ground of being as an absolute presence, as the transcendental making possible as the ontic causation of the real, as the transcendental making possible of the objectivity of objects. This ground of being as presence has reached its completion, and perfection as metaphysics has fulfilled itself as a form of Platonism. And, all its subsequent reversals of it in Nietzsche and Marx’s thought have signalled that metaphysics has entered its final stage. Heidegger thus thinks of the end of philosophy as the completion and fulfillment of metaphysics, which has simultaneously exhausted itself in its fulfillment and is thus undergoing reversal and destruction in its final stages in the thought of Nietzsche and Marx.
The Shift from Metaphysics to Ontology

In *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, Heidegger contests the philosophical enframing of world-view strictly in terms of science. This is part of Heidegger’s move away from ancient ontology which philosophy must destroy to arrive at the *primordial experiences* which determine the nature of Being. The problem with such a philosophical enframing according to Heidegger is its circularity in trying to justify ontology with theory. In other words, metaphysical axioms are being used to justify themselves in a circle, the problem that this gives rise to is ontological difference, or the institution of a gulf between the transcendental and empirical. Heidegger questions the separation of existence and essence, arguing that the problem with philosophy that is strictly critical idealism or critical realism is its one-sided world view, in other words, both idealism and realism are circular and one-sided in failing to grasp the fundamental ontological difference between the transcendental and empirical. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that both realism and idealism fall short of truth, which rather than being located in either realism or idealism is defined as *aletheia*, or the unveiling of truth through the disclosure of being. (Heidegger, 1962:57) For Heidegger being-in-the-world or ontology precedes essence, thus critical idealism and the phenomenological reduction fails to grasp being- the essential whatness and existence of a thing. Heidegger seeks to free phenomenology from the logical prejudice of theory in radicalizing phenomenology by returning to concrete existence.

Heidegger’s phenomenology, in place of intuition, privileges corporeality, embodiment, or being-in-the-world. Heidegger criticizes Husserl for his Cartesianism, emphasizing the situated-ness or thrown-ness of being. This radicalizes Husserl’s theory of intentionality in returning to the things themselves and performing a reverse bracketing of intuition in its place. With Derrida, we will see a middle ground, as he posits the quasi-transcendental, which is neither transcendental nor empirical but the economy of both the transcendental and empirical and the difference between them. Heidegger collapses the transcendental-empirical difference by suggesting that being precedes both essence and existence, in them the two meet and are conflated. Being is the ground of both the transcendental and empirical. Heidegger collapses subject-object difference by suggesting that consciousness essentially belongs to being-in-the-world or concrete existence. This then will be eventually critiqued by Derrida as the privileging of transcendental subjectivity and presence.

In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger reinforces his notion of philosophy as ontology, or a destruction of ancient ontology and a movement towards philosophy as the being of Being, by defining philosophy as a philosophy of extant being-in-the-world. These are the primordial experiences determined by the nature of Being previously
discussed. Heidegger reads Kant’s postulation that existence is not a predicate as a claim that collapses transcendental-empirical difference, being simply is, and is defined by its extant nature or its existence. Being is the foundation or ground of predication, it is a pre-condition or condition of possibility, rather than a property, and therefore cannot be relegated to transcendental pronouncements of its nature to determine it. The copula demonstrates this simple whatness of being and is an assertion or foundational condition of possibility of existence rather than a transcendental property which can be predicated. Heidegger questions the phenomenological reduction as it fails to acknowledge being-in-the-world, or thrown-ness, and collapses into a one-sided privileging of the transcendental.

For Heidegger being-in-the-world is disclosed or unveiled through the equipmental nature of perception, or the experience of objects as ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand. The Senegal African for instance fails to recognize the lectern for what it is because it is alien to him in its equipmental nature. This demonstrates that the world is disclosed through its instrumentality to human beings. Phenomenology must thus recognize this fundamental thrown-ness, or being-in-the-world, and read objects as a disclosure of being-in-the-world rather than merely present-at-hand, because this is how we fundamentally experience objects, not as transcendental entities but in an equipmental relation to ourselves. Heidegger questions the separation of perception from thing perceived, for Heidegger perception is the disclosure of the extant nature of thing perceived, in his statement on intentionality, Heidegger argues that perception is directed outwards toward the object and is the unveiling of the thing perceived, rather than separate from it.

Heidegger disputes metaphysics or critical idealism, seeking to destroy ancient ontology, to return to the things themselves, or being-in-the-world, as discussed earlier, to the primordial experiences determined by Being, with an emphasis on ontology and being. Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics or ancient ontology was a call to return to truth as disclosed in being, or aletheia, which is the disclosure of truth as being rather than through any transcendental metaphysical form. The problem with a transcendental theory of truth for Heidegger, is that it is mere knowledge of ideas, and not an ontological grasp or unveiling of truth, which involves the disclosure of Being and facticity as being-in-the-world rather than a hypostasized metaphysical realm. In Being and Time, he calls this essential condition thrown-ness, or Dasein, “being there.” Being is disclosed in its relation to worldhood, through the disclosure of things as ready-to-hand rather than simply present-at-hand, again this is the equipmental nature of objects making themselves apparent to Dasein. This sense of worldhood is one of the senses of the primordial experiences which determine the nature of Being. This emphasis on
worldliness is essentially a shift towards empirical idealism although Heidegger hypostasizes this realm by naming it the realm of Being. Heidegger emphasizes situatedness, thrown-ness and facticity. Yet, in *The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics*, Heidegger acknowledges that fundamental ontology is still ontology. Some awareness that his departure from metaphysics had merely paradoxically reinscribed and affirmed it was developing in the later stages of his career. Heidegger's phenomenology marks a fundamental shift in its emphasis on the situated-ness of perception or being-in-the-world, this thrown-ness is at direct odds with idealism as it is a swing to the other end of the intentional scale in prioritizing the empirical object and its situatedness. In this sense he disputes the transcendental and seeks what Derrida, in the *Ends of Man*, sees as an anthropological solution in positing Being or the Human as absolute.

**Aletheia**

Moving on to Heidegger's notion of truth as *aletheia*, reading from Heidegger:

What does the word about the untrembling heart of unconcealment mean? It means unconcealment itself in what is most its own, means the place of stillness which gathers in itself what grants unconcealment to begin with. That is the opening of what is open. We ask: openness for what? We have already reflected upon the fact that the path of thinking, speculative and intuitive, needs the traversable opening. But in that opening rests possible radiance, that is, the possible presencing of presence itself. (Heidegger, 2002: 68

This unconcealment as a form of opening translates as the presencing of presence, a disclosure of presence, where it had previously remained hidden or concealed. Heidegger argues that this unconcealing is a radicalization of intentionality in returning to the things themselves.

Heidegger takes the phenomenological call for a return “to the things themselves” as a call to move beyond metaphysics into ontology, to move beyond the thinking of idealism into the thinking of Being. Truth, which had been previously described as a form of concealment in Plato and Aristotle, becomes now reconfigured into *aletheia*, or unconcealing of Being, with Heidegger. *Aletheia* is not so much the disclosure of truth but what grants the very possibility of truth:

Insofar as truth is understood in the traditional ‘natural’ sense as the correspondence of knowledge with beings demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as the certainty of the knowledge of Being, alethia, unconcealment thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth. For truth itself, just as Being and thinking, can only be what it is in the kind of
verification of veritas already move with thatveritas in the realm of the prevalent opening.

Aletheia, unconcealment thought as the opening of presence, is not yet truth. Is aletheiathon less than truth? Or is it more because it first grants truth as adequatio and certitudo, because there can be no presence and presenting outside of the realm of the opening?

The question we leave to thinking as a task. Thinking must consider whether it can raise this question at all as long as it thinks philosophically, in the strict sense of metaphysics which questions what is present only with regard to its presence. (Heidegger 2002: 69-70)

The task of thinking becomes thus aletheia, to think that which grants the very possibility of truth as the un concealing or disclosure of Being, an opening of presence to the outside rather than an imprisonment of it behind a veil of disclosure. The task of thinking as aletheia becomes thus a disclosure of Being, which opens presence to its outside, and thus to our ontological grasp of it, rather than, as metaphysics has traditionally had it, a form of concealment and imprisonment in hidden ideal forms which remain inaccessible. As Heidegger argues, aletheia is not adequatio or certido, it is not representational thinking, but post-representation, in that it discloses and brings to light concealed elements of Being rather than being mere representation as it brings forth the disclosure of truth. Aletheia is the unconcealing of truth rather than the representation of truth, it brings forth the hidden meaning of art or its concealed truth. This ontological grasp of Being as aletheia becomes thus the disclosure of truth, which renders accessible to us the primordial ways of Being mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Heidegger further discusses aletheia in “The Origin of the Work of Art”:

The artwork lets us know what the shoes are in truth. It would be the worst self-deception to think that our description, as a subjective action, had first depicted everything thus and then projected it into the painting. If anything is questionable here, it is rather that we experienced too little in the nearness of the work and that we expressed the experience too crudely and too literally. But above all, the work did not, as it might seem at first, serve merely for a better visualizing of what a piece of equipment is. Rather, the equipmentality of equipment first expressly comes to the fore through the work and only in the work. (Heidegger, 1971: 161) Heidegger thus discusses aletheia as the disclosure of the truth of Being through art in terms of its equipmentality, or readiness-to-hand. Art discloses the truth of Being in its relation to Dasein in terms of its function as equipment for Dasein, indeed this is how Dasein fundamentally relates to the world, through the experience of things as either ready or present to hand. However,
Heidegger’s notion of truth as _aletheia_ borrows its entire ontological framework of Being as presence from metaphysics, while Heidegger describes this _aletheia_ as an opening of presence to the outside. The fundamental structure of presence as repetition, of essence and existence, despite being conflated and unified in Heidegger’s work, borrows and proceeds entirely from the language of metaphysics and thus repeats the metaphysics he attempts to destroy. Heidegger’s unconcealing or _aletheia_ does not alter the fundamental structures of metaphysics he sets out to destroy in the form of essence and existence which he conflates into Being but does not effect a change in the metaphysical or ontological structure by merely re-describing it as Being and its _aletheia_.

Heidegger radicalizes the notion of truth by describing it as unconcealing rather than concealing. In fact, what Heidegger is describing is the simple mediation of truth. Truth can be reduced to its appearance rather than relegated to an external and concealed realm. Heidegger performs a reverse bracketing of truth by reducing phenomenology to appearance which conceals nothing and discloses truth, as he discusses in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. Phenomena reveals truth by disclosing its equipmental nature. Heidegger thus performs a negation of transcendental truth by reversing the nature of the phenomenon in describing it as not secondary and representative of the ideal but describes it as the fundamental principle of the ideal- phenomena discloses rather than conceals, there is no disjuncture or separation between signifier and signified, both are related in the principle of disclosure and revelation- the signifier is the signified, reality is ontological and a disclosure of equipmentality rather than a metaphysical reflection or representation of a transcendental signified. Truth is not representational. Rather, truth is disclosure of Being through the phenomenon. Truth is ontological rather than a metaphysical abstraction. Heidegger thus conflates signifier and signified in his conception of truth, but does nothing to alter the fundamental structure of metaphysics. Heidegger’s notion of disclosure rather than concealing still presents truth as a dual entity consisting of the phenomenon and its presentation of truth as aletheia, or the unconcealing of Being. Positing that truth is something to be disclosed still separates truth ontologically into two realms: pre-disclosure and post-disclosure of the phenomenon as the revelation of Being. Heidegger thus repeats metaphysics although he reverses and negates it, as Derrida points out, a negative repetition of metaphysics proceeds entirely from its vocabulary and ontological structure. In describing it as unconcealing rather than concealing, Heidegger’s radicalization of truth is thus a negation or reversal and thus a repetition of metaphysics rather than a destruction of it. Heidegger thus does not manage to escape metaphysics, as he sets out to do.
Conclusion

In this paper I have examined Heidegger’s move to set out the task of philosophy as the destruction of metaphysics to move into the realm of ontology, or an inquiry into the being of Being. I have traced this movement of destruction in various Heidegger texts and pointed out its problematic as suggested by Derrida, that every instance of the destruction of metaphysics is in fact a repetition of it as it borrows entirely from the structure of metaphysics it sets out to destroy. Derrida critiques Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics in suggesting a non-metaphysics or destroyed metaphysics remains a metaphysics, and thus ultimately a destruction of metaphysics is simply a repetition or reproduction of it and hence, the same as metaphysics. Derrida thus discovers that metaphysics is repeated even in its destruction and thus is no different or the same as non-metaphysics or destroyed metaphysics.

References


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